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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SONDRA JANE PONS,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
CASE NO.

860110

EDWARD PONS.
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
WAS THERE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO
SUPPORT A REDUCTION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND A REDISTRIBUTING OF
MARITAL PROPERTY.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is defendant's .appeal of an order entered by the
Honorable Judith Billings, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, granting defendant's petition for modification of the
divorce decree to reduce alimony but denying a reduction of
child support and a redistribution of marital property.

The

Order of the Court appealed from was entered on January 21, 1986,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is a divorce proceeding which was originally
commenced December 9, 1982. After a trial a Decree of Divorce
was entered on July 27, 1983.

Subsequent to the divorce,

plaintiff brought numerous Order to Show Cause hearings on
contempt for defendant's failure to pay alimony and child
support, and defendant brought a petition for modification to
-1-

have alimony reduced or eliminated, to have child support
reduced, and to have the Court redistribute marital assets
previously distributed pursuant to the Divorce Decree entered in
July of 1983.
A hearing was held December 27, 1985, on Plaintifffs
Order to Show Cause for contempt and Defendant's Petition to
Modify, Judge Billings eliminated the alimony but did not
reduce child support nor redistribute marital assets, and held
the defendant in contempt and had him incarcerated in the Salt
Lake County Jail.

(See Judgment and Order on December 27, 1985

hearing.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees with Defendant's Statement of Facts
and adopts the same except for the following:
1.

At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered,

defendant did not present any evidence to the above Court in
regards to the value of the real estate investments, and
plaintiff presented evidence that a $60,000.00 mortgage was
obtained by the defendant on the home and residence of the
parties and said monies was used by defendant to invest in the
subject real estate investments.
2.

That defendant's average monthly income at the

time of the Decree of Divorce was approximately $2,500.00 per
month and the amount of child support and alimony awarded to the
plaintiff was approximately fifty percent (50%) of the defendant's
gross income.

Defendant's health has improved and his earning

capacity has increased.

3.

That at the time of the hearing on the 27th day of

December, 1985, defendant's ability to pay alimony and child
support was the same as it was at the time of the Decree of
Divorce and his income was approximately the same; however, the
plaintiff's income had increased by approximately $400 per
month.

Both parties living expenses had increased. (See

Findings of Fact of hearing held on December 27, 1985).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The defendant failed to establish any substantial
change of circumstances in regards to defendant's ability to pay
child support and the needs of the plaintiff and therefore the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's
Petition to Reduce the Child Support Payments.
Further the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Defendant's Petition to Redistribute the Marital
Property since again defendant failed to establish any
substantial change of circumstances in regards to the same or
any fraud involved in the original distribution of said property
through the Decree of Divorce.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
REDUCE CHILD SUPPORT.
-3-

The doctrine of res judicata is based on the concept
that the court should not be called upon to adjudicate twice
upon the same set of facts.

Such considerations, if applied

strictly, require the rule that a petition to modify an order
for child support cannot be based on the same set of facts that
existed when the original order was made*

Accordingly, to

justify a modification it must ordinarily appear that there has
been a substantial change in the material circumstances since
the time of the original order.

[Gardner v. Gardner, 177 P.2d 743

(Utah 1947), and Scott v. Scott, 142 P.2d 198 (Utah 1943)].
The burden of proof that modification of child support
provisions from the Decree of Divorce is warranted lies with the
party seeking modification.

[Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374

(Utah 1980), and Haslem v. Haslem, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982)].
Defendant has failed to meet this burden of proof.
There has been no substantial change of circumstances
to warrant the reduction of existing child support.

Defendant

is still employed in the same line of work, that of tuning and
selling pianos, and has the same opportunities available as at
the time of the divorce for making adequate income to cover his
expenses.

Defendant also enjoys better health than at the time

of the divorce and so is more physically capable of earning a
living than before.

Although the defendant argues in his brief

that his level of income decreased from the time of the Decree
of Divorce to the present, the Trial Court after hearing all of
-4-

the evidence found that in fact his income had not decreased
significantly and further that defendant's capacity to earn
income was the same if not better than at the time of the Decree
of Divorce due to his improvement in health.
The fact that the defendant's level of income may have
decreased due to his decision to not put in as much time and/or
effort in his occupation, is not a substantial change of
circumstances and defendant may not intentionally escape his
child support obligation by deciding not to put forth the effort to
maintain his income level.

[Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374

(Utah 1980) and Westonskow v. Westonskow, 562 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1977)].
Further, at the time of the divorce there were three
minor children which child support was awarded.

At the time of

the hearing on Defendant's Petition to Modify, there were only
two minor children so the child support had in fact been reduced
due to the fact that one of the children had reached the age of
emancipation.

Therefore, defendant's capability of providing

support had actually increased.
The defendant argues in his brief that the Findings of
Fact by the Trial Court as to defendant's present income and
capacity to earn income were inconsistent with the evidence
presented at the modification hearing.

Said argument is erroneous

since defendant presented in its Statement of Facts in its
Brief that defendant at the time of the divorce was earning
approximately $2,100 per month and his Defendant's Exhibit

-5-

6d of

his 1984 Financial Statement attached to Defendant's Brief
indicated that his 1984 gross income was $24,660.

Further the

defendant did not object to said Findings of Fact for said
modification hearing and further approved the same.
Therefore, the Trial Court having examined all of the
circumstances and evidence presented to it, did not abuse its
discretion by failing to modify the Decree of Divorce and reduce
the child support.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY NOT REDISTRIBUTING THE MARITAL PROPERTY AND
ASSETS.
Plaintiff does not contend with the fact that the Trial
Court had continuing jurisdiction to make changes with regards
to the distribution of property but again there must be a
substantial change of circumstances or condition of the parties
since the entry of the original Decree. In the present case,
there is none and defendant did not present any evidence at the
modification hearing to even suggest that there was a change of
circumstances.

The Trial Court at the trial heard all of the

evidence and distributed the property.

Defendant's argument on

appeal is that the Trial Court at the trial failed to take into
consideration that the real estate investments awarded to the
defendant were involved in bankruptcy.

As is stated by the

exhibits attached to Defendant's Brief, the bankruptcy for said
-6-

real estate investments were filed prior to the divorce trial in
this matter.

The fact that defendant may have failed to bring

said bankrupty to the attention of the Trial Judge at the
divorce hearing on this matter is not a change of circumstances
in regards to having the court redistribute the property asset.
Again, the defendant failed to present any evidence to the Trial
Court at the hearing on the modification as to any change of
circumstances in regards to the home and residence and the real
estate investments awarded to the defendant. [Dixon v. Dixon,
240 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952)].
In dividing the property in the marriage dissolution
proceeding and later in reviewing the Decree in the modification
hearing, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the property to the parties. At the time the property
and assets were divided between the parties, there was no fraud
involved on the part of the plaintiff and the fact that the real
estate investments were involved in bankruptcy has no bearing on
the fact that at the time of the divorce the property was
distributed in a fair and equitable manner.
In Berger v. Berger,

P.2d

, 14 Utah Adv. Rep.

4, (Utah 1985), the Court reversed and remanded the question of
the value of one particular asset, which the Trial Court did not
believe had been properly valued as of its alleged date of sale
and had therefore valued it at a prior known value.

The Supreme

Court held that the martial estate must be valued as of the
-7-

divorce trial, citing its previous ruling of Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
In dividing property in a marriage dissolution
proceeding; marital estates are evaluated according to what
property exists at the time the marriage is terminated.
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).
Therefore, the Trial Court, did not abuse its
discretion by failing to redistribute the marital property and
assets of the parties, since defendant's only argument is that
the value of his assets decreased.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's Order and Judgment on the
modification hearing should be affirmed and plaintiff should be
awarded its costs incurred.
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